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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The stricter attitude toward licensing of ordinary occupations reached
its culmination when, in a well reasoned opinion,48 the North Carolina
Supreme Court flatly reversed the decision in State v. Lawrence and
declared that the statute setting up the State Board of Photographic
Examiners violates Article I, Sections 1, 17, and 31 of the Constitution
of the State of North Carolina.49 This decision removes the incon-
sistency in our law brought about by the departure in State v. Harris5 °
from the attitude taken in the Lawrence case, and makes it plain that
engaging in ordinary occupations having no special connection with the
objectives of the police power may not be restricted by the enactment
of licensing statutes. The earlier haphazard enactment of licensing
statutes and uncritical judicial approval of them appears during the
eleven years since the Lawrence case to have given way to a legislative
attitude requiring that these enactments be justified by a bona fide public
purpose, and to a judicial policy of close scrutiny of such enactments
to ascertain whether they genuinely protect the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare and thus bear an actual relationship rather
than a theoretical one to these objectives of the police power.
ROBERT LEE HINEs.
Civil Procedure-Less Than Unanimous Jury Verdicts
A recent discussion1 in a Senate Committee of the 1949 state legis-
lature concerned the feasibility of introducing a bill to provide for less
than unanimous verdicts in civil cases. Although no action was taken
in the matter, it would seem timely to consider briefly herein the argu-
ments for and against a modification of our current requirement of
unanimity.
At common law a jury verdict meant a unanimous verdict.2 There-
Committee report) ; H. R. Bill No. 713 (1949) (would repeal Art. 2 of Chapter
87 of the General Statutes which set up the State Board of Examiners for Plumb-
ing and Heating Contractors-unfavorable House committee report) ; H. R. Bill
No. 906 (1949) (would remove persons furnishing or erecting industrial equip-
ment, power plant equipment, or radial brick chimneys from the general contractors
licensing act-enacted) ; H. R. Bill No. 1233 (1949) (would authorize issuance of
"limited licenses" for practice of law in certain districts-unfavorable House com-
mittee report).
' State v. Ballance, 229 N. C. 764, 51 S. E. 2d 731 (1949).
"' See note 6 supra.
o State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. 2d 854 (1939).
News and Observer, Jan. 20, 1949, p. 16, col. 7.
2 3 BL. Comma. *379 ("The trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever will be,
looked upon as the glory of the English law. . . . it is the most transcendent
privilege which any subject can enjoy . . . that he cannot be affected either in his
property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of
his neighbors and equals."); 1 COOLEY'S CONST. LIm. 677 (8th ed., Carrington,
1927) ; SEDGWICK, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CoNsT. LAw 493 n. (2nd ed.
1874).
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fore, when the American states used the expression, "trial by jury,"
in their constitutions, it has been uniformly held that this meant a ver-
dict to which all of the jurors assented3 and that any legislation pro-
viding for majority verdicts where jury trial is a matter of right would
be unconstitutional in the absence of an express constitutional provision
authorizing such a change. 4
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution requires
that trials by jury shall be according to the course of the common law,
but it has been established that this requirement is not applicable to the
states, 5 for the provisions of the Seventh Amendment apply only to the
federal government." And the great weight of authority is to the effect
that the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution does not even require a jury trial in a state
court.7 Hence it is not a violation of the federal constitution for a state
to authorize a verdict by less than the full number of jurors.8
Our North Carolina Constitution guarantees the right of trial by
jury in civil cases9 saying that ". . . the ancient mode of trial by jury
is one of the best securities of the rights of the people and ought to
remain sacred and inviolable." That this means a unanimous verdict
is well established.' This would indicate beyond doubt that any at-
tempt to change the law of North Carolina would have to be by a con-
stitutional amendment.
There are two types of constitutional provisions that have been
Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 (1929) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Green,
37 F. Supp. 949 (W. D. Ky. 1941); Minnequa Cooperage Co. v. Hendricks, 130
Ark. 264, 197 S. W. 280 (1917) ; (dissent said that the phrase "the right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolate" in the constitution does not specify how a verdict
shall be rendered, and the silence of the constitution means that the legislature is
to control the matter; that the constitution is a declaration of principles and not
details; and that other states merely follow each other blindly on this question.).
'Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Harvey, 209 Ind. 262, 198 N. E. 782 (1935);
Franklin v. St. Louis & M. R. R., 188 Mo. 533, 87 S. W. 930 (1905); In re
Opinon of Justices, 41 N. H. 550 (1860).
St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Brown, 241 U. S. 223 (1915).
Even in an action in state courts under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
the provisions of the Seventh Amendment are not applicable and state courts can
give effect to a local practice permitting a less than unanimous verdict: Minne-
apolis & S. L. R. R. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211 (1915); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
Shaw, 168 Ky. 537, 182 S. W. 653 (1916) ; aff'd, 243 U. S. 626 (1916).
ISouthern Ry. v. Durham, 266 U. S. 178 (1924) ; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v.
Cole, 251 U. S. 54 (1919).
'Fay v. N. Y., 332 U. S. 261, 288 (1946) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319,
324 (1937) ; Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 (1933) ; Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U. S. 510, 534 (1926) ; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210 (1916).
'Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900); Weaver v. Cuff, 52 S. D. 51, 216
N. W. 600 (1927).
9 N. C. Co Nsr. Art. I, §19; Hershey Corp. v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 207 N. C.
122, 176 S. E. 265 (1934).




used to authorize majority verdicts-self-executing" and non-self
executing.' 2 In the former there is no need for further legislative action
while in the latter the provisions for less than unanimous verdicts are
effectuated only by legislative enactments.
In discussing the jury system, some writers have urged a limited
use only of civil juries'3 while others have advocated abolishing the jury
in civil cases. 4 Still others feel that the civil jury is not likely to be
done away with; hence the jury system should be reformed by permit-
ting the use of majority verdicts.:5
The arguments advanced are that the unanimous verdict is kept only
because of traditional reluctance to change from the status quo ;16 that
many lawyers are opposed for purely selfish reasons ;17 that the present
unanimity is apparent and not real;1s that with the unanimity require-
ment, strong jurors coerce weak jurors-;9 that unanimity gives one
recalcitrant or dishonest juror the power to hold up the whole judicial
process ;20 that the use of majority verdicts is now widespread ;21 that
our democratic form of government is based on the rule of the major-
ity;22 that jurors come from varied backgrounds and expecting twelve
"E.g., CALIF. CONST. Art. I, §7.
"2 E.g., WASH. CONST. Art. I, §21; WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. §358 (1932).
'" Clark & Shulman, Jury Trial in- Civil Cases-A Study in Judicial Adininis-
tration, 43 YALE L. Q. 867, 885 (1934).
" Peterson, Reform in Civil Jury Frocedue, 5 N. C. L. RaV. 89 (1927);
Duane, Civil Jury Should Be Abolished, 12 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 137 (1929); Mc-
Lemore, An Argument Against Jury Trial in Civil Cases, 20 VA. L. REv. 708
(1934).
"Winters, Majority Verdicts in the United States, 26 3. Am. Jun. Soc'y 87
(1942); Weinstein, Trial by Jury and Unanimus Verdicts, 69 U. S. L. REv. 513
(1935).
" Linn, Changes in Trial by Jury, 3 TEMP. L. Q. 3, 13 (1928).
'" Lindsey, The Unanimity of Jury Verdicts, 5 VA. L. REG. 133 (1899) ("de-
fendant" lawyers, men who are corporation or business counsel, are likely to be
opposed for the hope of success for a particular case may often depend upon con-
vincing a minority rather than the majority).
"sLESSER, HISTORY OF THE JURY SYSTEM 187 (1894) ; 10 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
373 (1936) ("Where the verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence, the
trial judge is given the discretion to set aside and grant a new trial, which brings
about the same results as if the jury had been unable to come to an agreement.
However, where the case is not quite so clear, these forced compromises are not
set aside, but are allowed to decide the matter.").
" Miner, The Jury Problem, 4 ILL. L. REV. 183 (1946) ("Coercion, is not a
symbol of justice.") ; Barnett, The Jury's Agreement-Ideal and Real, 20 ORE. L.
REV. 189 (1941); Bailey, Improvement of Trial by Jury, 17 MAss. L. Q. 11
(1932) (in olden days various methods were used to bring about agreement of all
jurors-food, drink and heat withheld; if court was on circuit, judge might have
jury put in carts and taken along to the next place where court was to be held.).
"o Marantz, Shall We End the Unanimity Rule for Verdicts in- Civil Cases?,
70 N. J. L. J. 269 (1947).
21 Winters, supra note 15, at 89.
..2 Marantz, supra note 20 (United States Supreme Court and state appellate
courts render decisions by majority rule) ; Wilkin, The Jury: Reformation, Not
Abolition, 13 J. AMt. JUD. Soc'y 154 (1930) ; Linn, supra note 16, at 11; Winters,
supra note 15, at 88; Weinstein, supra note 15, at 523; Lindsey, supra note 17, at
142 (United States Senate may impeach the President by majority of one vote,
Court of Claims determines property rights involving millions with judges trying
fact and finding law).
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such people to agree, especially on complicated factual situations, is
ridiculous ;23 that there are too many hung juries ;24 that the change
would deal a serious blow to the practice of tampering with and fixing
a jury ;25 that court calendars would be cleared up because of fewer
retrials;26 that the nominal verdicts so often rendered by unanimous
juries are most often unjust ;27 that if there is a real danger from hasty
majority verdicts, the state could specify a time within which the ver-
dict must be unanimous ;2s and that the reluctance of people to sit on
juries under the present system because of the time consumed in trying
to get a unanimous verdict would no longer be present. 29
Advocates of the requirement of unanimity reply that the unanimous
verdict should be retained as it is an old and cherished feature of the
American plan for the administration of justice;30 that litigants have
more confidence in it ;31 that the hung jury is typically American in
that it dignifies the rights of the minority ;32 that a change would result
in the bringing of a greater number of doubtful suits and would result
in unduly large assessments of damages by a majority in a hurry to
render a verdict-3s that rash decisions by a weak majority would fol-
low ;34 that alleged prejudicial jurors which cause hung juries are
eliminated by the prior examination of jurors by competent counsel ;3r
that unanimity is required to offset the advantages which the plaintiff
receives from the order of procedure ;36 that after all, hung juries are
relatively few and retrial often proves that the views of dissenting
jurors were right ;37 that the change to a majority verdict would bring
on confusion from more motions for retrial for misconduct of jurors,
more new trials being granted, and more appeals based on adverse rul-
- arantz, supra note 20.
24Mardntz, supra note 20; Wilkin, supra note 22, at 155; Note, 34 ILL. L.
REv. 240 (1940) ; Winters, supra note 15.
2 Note, 22 CORNELL L. Q. 415 (1937); Linn, supra note 16; Barnett, supra
note 19, at 205.
28 Marantz, supra note 20; Linn, supra note 16.
Bouchelle, Requirement of Consent of Three-fourths of Jury to Verdicts in
Cizil Actions, Abolishing Law of Unanimous Consent, 48 W. VA. L. Q. 149
(1942) ; Note, 22 CORNELL L. Q. 415 (1937) ; Winters, supra note 15, at 88 (too
often one juror holds out and you get a verdict in accordance with his views;
especial danger that where liability is established, minority opinion will control
amount of damages.).
"8 Weinstein, supra note 15, at 523.
' Linn, supra note 16, at 14.
2- 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 318 (3rd ed. 1922).
2137 COL. L. REV. 1235 (1937).
22Majority Verdicts Debated it Texas, 26 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 184 (1943).
32 Weinstein, supra note 15, at 523.
24Note, 34 ILL. L. REV. 236 (1939).
2 Weinstein, supra note 15, at 523.
28Ibid. (Plaintiff in most cases has advantage of opening and closing the argu-
ments, and in most negligence cases, plaintiff has the further advantage of sym-
pathy as against a rich defendant or insurance company.).
" Boone & Potts, Majority Verdicts for Texas, 6 TEx B. J. 118 (1943).
[Vol. 27
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ings on the motions for retrial .38 and that the end result of it all would
be more expense in labor and delay than caused now by the unanimity
requirement.3 9
An extra consideration to be noted is the problem presented in any
state using special verdicts40 and permitting majority verdicts as to
whether or not the same majority of the jurors should agree on all the
issues of the case. The Wisconsin courts have held that since the intent
of the less than unanimous provisions are merely to reduce the required
number of jurors that need assent to a valid verdict, the agreement
of the same jurors is necessary on all the essential questions.41 Wash-
ington reaches the opposite result.4 2  It has been argued that the Wis-
consin result is the more logical since the questions of the special verdict
express the steps that would be necessary to find a general verdict and
disagreement in the answering of any one of these questions should
have the same effect as such a disagreement would have in the finding
on that fact if the jury was to return a general verdict.43 The Wash-
ington position has been supported as the better one44 on the ground
that "the change from unanimous verdicts recognizes that juries are
engaged not in finding the 'truth' but are venturing opinions which as
such establish probabilities of fact sufficient in the judgment of the
legislature to warrant a verdict. Consequently an agreement of the
stipulated majority on any question presented is an adequate indication
of probability to conform to the legislative requirement and therefore
should be sufficient." In connection with this problem, it should be
noted that many states which have permitted less than unanimous ver-
dicts require all the jurors assenting to the verdict to sign it45 so as to
prevent litigation on the question of which of the jurors assented to
particular issues and also whether the required number acquiesced.
The widespread use today of majority verdicts is shown by the fact
that fourteen states permit a verdict by three-fourths of the jurors ;46
"Majority Verdicts Debated in Texas, 26 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 184 (1943);
Boone & Potts, supra note 37, at 137.
"Boone & Potts, supra note 37, at 138.'oNorth Carolina does: N. C. GEN. STAT. §§1-201, 202 (1943).
41 Christensen v. Petersen, 198 Wis. 222, 223 N. W. 839 (1929); Larson v.
Koller, 198 Wis. 160, 223 N. W. 426 (1929) ; 25 MIcH. L. REv. 563 (1927) ; 40
HARV. L. REv. 916 (1927).
"Bullock v. Yakima Valley Transp. Co., 118 Wash. 413, 184 Pac. 641 (1919).
"7 Wis. L. REv. 111 (1932). "37 COL. L. REV. 1235 (1937).
"E.g., Kentucky, New Mexico, Oklahoma.
"'ARIz. CoxsT. Art. II, §23; ARIZ. CODE ANN. §21-1003 (1939); ARK. CoNST.
AMEND. XVI; CALIF. CONST. Art. I, §7; CONN. CONST. Art. I, §21; CONN. GEN.
STAT. §7971 (1949) ; IDAHO CoNsT. Art. I, §7; IDAHO LAWS ANN. §2-104 (1943) ;
KY. CONST. §248; Ky. REv. STAT. §§29.330, 29.340 (1946) ; LA. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§1958 (1939) ; LA. CODE PRAc. ANN. art. 527 (1942) ; MISS. CON sT. Art. III, §31;
MIsS. CODE ANN. §1801 (1942); Mo. CoNsT. Art. II, §28; Mo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§719 (1939) ; NEV. CoNsT. Art. I, §3; OHIo CoxsT. Art. I, §5; OHio GEN. CODE
ANN. §11420-9 (1938); OKLA. CoNsT. Art. II, §19; ORE. CoNsT. Art. VII, §18;
UTAH COXST. Art. I, §10.
19491
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
six states permit a verdict by five-sixths of the jurors ;47 Nebraska
allows a five-sixths verdict after six hours deliberation;48 Minnesota
allows a five-sixths verdict after twelve hours deliberation ;40 Montana
and Virginia allow a two-thirds verdict ;50 Iowa permits a valid verdict
by a bare majority if the parties stipulate it ;1 Colorado permits the
parties to stipulate any majority;52 and the Texas Constitution would
permit a less than unanimous verdict,5 3 but by statute 4 the constitutional
provision for three-fourths verdicts is limited to situations where one
or more jurors is disabled from sitting. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 5 provide that the parties may stipulate that a verdict or
finding of a stated majority of the jurors would be valid as the verdict
or finding of the jury.
It is submitted that the people of North Carolina should give con-
sideration to the question of whether or not the requirement of una-
nimity is outmoded and should be abolished. If it should be decided to
abolish it, attention should be given in the drafting of the necessary
constitutional amendment and the ensuing legislation, if any is required,
to the advisability of making definite provision therein for the agreement
to be required in connection with the separate issues submitted to the
jury and for a signing of the verdict.
JoHNr M. Simms.
Constitutional Law-Denial of Due Process.-Insuifficient
Time to Prepare Defense
A person accused of crime is guaranteed the right to be represented
by counsel.' This right to representation necessarily includes an oppor-
"N. J. CoNST. Art. I, §9 (new 1947 constitution permits legislature to provide
for five-sixths verdicts); N. M. CONST. Art. II, §12; N. M. STAT. ANN. §§19-101,
(48) (b) (1941) ; N. Y. CONST. Art. I, §2; N. Y. Cxv. PRAc. AcT §463-a; S. D.
CONsT. Art. VI, §6; S. D. CODE §33.1333 (1939) (circuit courts), (justice courts:
three-fourths, S. D. CODE §33.1334 (1939)); WASH. CONST. Art. I, §21; WASH.
REv. STAT. ANN. §358 (1932); Wis. CoNsT. Art. I, §5; Wis. STAT. §270.25
(1947).
"NE. CoNsT. Art. I, §6; NEB. REV. STAT. §25-1125 (1943).
"MINN. CONST. Art. I, §4; MINN. STAT. §546.17 (Henderson 1945).
10 MONT. CoNsT. Art. III, §23; MONT. REv. CoDES ANN. §9358 (1935); VA.
CONST. Art. I, §11; VA. CODE ANN. §6012 (1942).
" IOWA CONST. Art. I, §9; IowA RULES Civ. PRoC. §203(a) (supersedes IOWA
CODE §11483 (1939)).
5 COLO. CoNsT. Art. II, §23; CoLo. STAT. ANN. rule 48 (1935).
TEX. CoNsT. Art. V, §13.
5 4 TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2204 (1941).
SFED. R. Crv. P., 48.
'U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 485 (1944) ; Tom-
kins v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 471 (1944); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444 (1939);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 44 (1932); Kelly v. Oregon, 273 U. S. 589 (1926);
Frank v. Mangum; 237 U. S. 309 (1914) ; Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123 (1905).
N. C. Coxst. Art. I, §11 (the original constitution of North Carolina (1776) did
[Vol. 27
